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Abstract: While there is much interest by NGOs and environmental groups in the 
potential of non-timber forest products (NTFP) programs to simultaneously achieve 
conservation and poverty alleviation, there is not a great deal of understanding of whether 
they work in practice, and how incentives and local management do, indeed affect poverty 
and local resource use. In this paper I propose a methodology to analyze the potential 
impacts that price increases can have on the income that extractors receive from NTFP 
extraction. The case study illustrates how one could evaluate the effectiveness of different 
price scenarios. It also shows the kind of biologic and socioeconomic information that is 
needed to apply the methodology suggested. The more accurate the information is the more 
confident one can be about the policy recommendations. This is an area of opportunity 
where applied research between economists and ecologists can lead to concrete policy 
applications.   
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1. Introduction  
It has been argued by NGOs and environmental groups that conservation and poverty 
alleviation might be simultaneously achieved by promoting the local use and stewardship of 
environmental services that sustain natural systems. In the case of the commercial extraction 
of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) the two implicit assumptions are: a) harvesting of 
NTFPs is less destructive, in terms of biodiversity, than timber harvesting, and, b) novel or 
expanded markets are needed to increase the returns from NTFPs for locals in order to 
provide better incentives to conserve forests (this works under the assumption that NTFPs 
need the presence of the trees in order to be able to grow).  If, in addition, those who extract 
the resource are poor, then it is argued that an increase in the price (or the quantity 
demanded) of NTFPs could alleviate poverty while promoting conservation (Neumann and 
Hirsch, 2000; Lybbert et al., 2002; Belcher et al., 2005). This is the logic behind programs 
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that have encouraged Amazonians to extract NTFPs like Brazil nuts in order to generate 
local income from activities other than deforestation. Other programs, such as the shade tree 
coffee program, develop and promote markets that sustain higher prices for products that are 
both sustainable and that maintain natural ecosystem functions.  
While there is much interest in NTFP programs and similar programs in other 
ecosystems, there is not a great deal of understanding of whether they work in practice, and 
how incentives and local management do, indeed affect poverty and local resource use. In 
this paper I leave aside the discussion about deforestation to analyze the potential impacts 
that price increases can have on the income that extractors receive from NTFP extraction. 
The next section presents a simple theoretical model and section 3 presents its basic 
implications. Section 4 concludes. 
  
2. Theoretical model of TFP extraction 
The model that I propose is a modification of the model presented in Lopez-Feldman and 
Wilen (2008). The resource that is being modeled is a marketable NTFP whose extraction is 
labor intensive and with minimal capital requirements.  Extraction takes place in day trips 
and the only variable input that extractors control is the allocation of their time.   
To represent total NTFP harvest (i.e., harvest by all individuals during a period of time t ) 
I use a model based on Schaefer (1957). That is, total harvest is defined as qLXH = , where 
q  is a proportional harvesting coefficient, L  is the total number of days worked in NTFP 
extraction during the period (say one year) by all individuals, and X  is the stock of the 
resource.   
I assume that, if left undisturbed, the resource will grow over time according to a logistic 
function. Other studies have used a logistic function to characterize the growth of 
harvestable populations of NTFPs (see Bhat and Huffaker, 1991; Bluffstone, 1995; and 
Gunatileke and Chakravorty, 2003). Therefore, the NTFP growth function under harvesting 
is represented by: 
[1] 1
X
X rX H
K
= − −
 
 
 
ɺ  
where r  is the intrinsic growth rate of the NTFP and K  is the carrying capacity.   
 3
The present analysis focuses on NTFPs that are common-pool resources, that is, for 
which (a) there is rivalry in appropriation, and (b) exclusion of potential appropriators or 
limitation of appropriation by existing users is nontrivial though not necessarily impossible 
(Ostrom et al., 1994). The resource is held under common property, all members of the 
community have access to it. I assume that although no individual has exclusive property 
rights to the resource, the community is able to exclude outsiders from appropriation. I 
assume that this is enforced, and only the local rights-holders harvest the resource. In 
addition, there is an absence of rules or strategies to manage the resource.  
Following Gordon’s (1954) seminal paper, under an unmanaged regime effort flows until 
the rents are dissipated. This implies that labor will be allocated to extraction until total 
revenue ( pH ) is equal to total cost (wL ), where p represents the price of the resource and w  
is the opportunity cost of one day of labor. This behavior leads, in equilibrium, to the 
following amount of labor being allocated to extraction: 
[2] 





−=
pqK
w
q
r
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*    
Implicit in this solution is the assumption that there is enough labor locally to drive the 
system into a bioeconomic equilibrium in which rents are dissipated. The next section 
explores the implications of local labor constraints that prevent this from happening. 
 
2.1. Labor constraints 
In most settings of pure open access the natural assumption to make is that there are no 
labor constraints. However, this is not necessarily the case with all common property, 
particularly in cases where isolated villages with fixed labor utilize local common resources. 
To illustrate this, I add the assumption of relative shortage of local or community labor to the 
assumption that outsiders are excluded from extracting the common-pool resource. To 
clarify what is meant by a relative shortage of labor consider a case where, given the values 
of all parameters in the optimization problem, the amount of labor that leads to rent 
dissipation is greater than the labor available from the right-holders of the resource. That is, 
there is a relative shortage of labor if LL >* , where *L  is defined as in equation (2)  and L  
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is total local labor available. It can be shown that under these circumstances the returns from 
a day of work are higher than the opportunity cost of time.   
 
2.2 Labor heterogeneity  
Up until now I have assumed that labor is homogenous in the sense that all individuals 
have the same opportunity cost of time and the same productivity in extracting the natural 
resource. This need not be the case. Individuals can have access to different labor 
alternatives and therefore have different opportunity costs of time, depending on their 
individual and household characteristics. Those characteristics might also affect productivity 
in the extractive activity. In this section the assumption of homogeneous productivity in the 
extractive activity is maintained but heterogeneity in the opportunity cost of time is 
considered.        
Assume that there are two types of individuals with opportunity costs 1w  and 2w  where 
21 ww < . Type-1 individuals, the low opportunity cost type, will allocate labor to extraction 
until the value of an additional day of work is equal to the opportunity cost of time. Under 
these conditions type-2 individuals will not find it profitable to participate in NTFP 
extraction. Therefore, if the resource is not managed and labor is heterogeneous, only those 
with a low opportunity cost of time participate in NTFP extraction, and they receive 1w  as 
payment for every time-unit of work.   
Nevertheless, this is not the case when there is a relative shortage of type-1 labor (i.e., if 
1
*
LL > ). Under these circumstances even though all type-1 labor is allocated to resource 
extraction, revenues for a unit of labor (θ ) are higher than 1w . If in fact the value of the 
marginal product of a unit of labor is higher than 2w , then type-2 individuals will participate 
in NTFP extraction, as well. This requirement is captured by the following participation 
condition:  
[3]      2w≥θ   
If the condition holds, then type-2 individuals allocate labor to extract the NTFP until 
their returns are equal to 2w , assuming that there is no labor shortage of type-2 individuals. 
Although the generalization of this problem to include more than two types of individuals as 
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well as labor constraints in more than one type of individuals is straightforward, it is 
arithmetically tedious and would add little by way of insight. Therefore, throughout this 
analysis I concentrate on the case in which there are two types of labor, only one of which is 
labor constrained. 
 
3. Income received from TFP extraction  
As discussed in the introduction, one policy that some conservationists are promoting is 
market development for products that are considered compatible with preservation of natural 
resources. This raises the question:  what impacts might a successful “green marketing” 
campaign have on extractors of a NTFP?  
From the extractor’s welfare point of view, the most important impact is the effect of the 
price change on revenue per-day of work. When the resource is not managed, rent is 
dissipated, implying that the revenue per-day of work is equal to the opportunity cost. This 
means that price increases have no impact on the revenue that individual extractors receive 
from a day of extraction.  
Under these circumstances, a successful green marketing campaign that raises NTFP 
prices may not improve the per capita welfare of NTFP extractors. A policy whose main 
objective is to alleviate poverty via higher product prices will, without community 
management, result in an increase in the number of days allocated to extraction. 
Nevertheless, extractors receive the same net revenue as before (i.e., w ) for a day of work. If 
w  is the wage earned in an alternative employment activity, then the only effect of the NTFP 
premium will be a reallocation of more labor from the alternative activity to resource 
extraction.   
 
3.1. Extractors’ income under labor constraints and heterogeneity 
In spite of these pessimistic results, under some circumstances it is possible for a price 
increase in an unmanaged common property resource to contribute towards poverty 
alleviation via an increase in revenues per-day of work. When the resource is not managed 
and there is a binding labor constraint price changes do not have an effect on the quantity 
extracted but they do affect revenues. If, in addition, labor is heterogeneous, price increases 
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will result in revenue increases for low-opportunity-cost individuals as long as the high-
opportunity-cost individuals do not participate in extraction.   
The labor constraint could be binding depending on the specific values of the parameters 
of the problem. Consider the case where all parameters except price are fixed. Then there is 
a price that makes the amount of total labor allocated to extraction equal to the labor 
available from the rights-holders of the resource. That is, there is a price *p  at which 
LL =* , therefore, if outside labor is effectively excluded from extracting the resource, a 
price increase above *p  will increase the income received by individuals above and beyond 
their opportunity cost of time. Using equation 2 we have that:  
[4]     
( )LqrqK
wr
p
−
=*   
Figure 1 illustrates these results. Earnings per-day remain constant at the level w  for 
*
ppqKw << . On the other hand, when *pp >  earnings per-day become an increasing 
function of price. Under this institutional setting a policy that introduces a NTFP price 
premium can in fact have a positive impact on the income received by extractors, even 
without the need to coordinate behavior.
1
 
Another possible setting is the one with labor being not only constrained but also 
heterogeneous. The relative scarcity of low opportunity cost labor (i.e., 1
*
LL > ) implies that 
type-1 individuals receive a return for their participation in NTFP extraction that is higher 
than their opportunity cost of time. In this situation, price increases can reduce poverty, 
although earnings per-day of work do not increase continuously with respect to price as they 
do when labor is scarce but homogeneous (and *pp > ). 
Figure 2 illustrates this situation with two types of individuals. Along the price range 





 *
,
1
p
qK
w
 individuals receive 1w  for a day of work. Beyond 
*
p , all type-1 labor is allocated 
                                                 
1 Even though the model I propose is not designed to directly analyze deforestation one could argue that the pressure on 
forests could be reduced if labor used to extract timber or to clear land for agriculture is now diverted to NTFP’s extraction. 
If that is the case then as price goes up the pressure on the forest goes down. In the context of Figure 1 if price is greater or 
equal to p* then there is no deforestation as all labor is allocated to NTFPs extraction. I thank an anonymous reviewer for 
pointing this out.     
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to extraction and although type-2 individuals could reallocate labor from other activities to 
extraction, they do not do so until the price is right, that is, until price is such that earnings 
per-day are equal to 2w . The price at which this happens in Figure 2 is 
**
p .   
Therefore, in the price range [ **,* pp ] the supply of labor remains constant, while 
earnings per-day increase with price. When the price surpasses **p , type-2 individuals enter 
into extraction, and earnings per-day are constant at 2w . That is, type-1 individuals do not 
experience any further gains from price increases once type-2 individuals begin to supply 
labor.
2
 
Although the level that revenue per-day of extraction can reach is bounded by 2w , a price 
premium can have a positive impact on the income received by extractors as long as the 
original price is below **p  (and the new price is above *p ). Under relative scarcity of 
heterogeneous labor we have that: 
[5]     
( )1
1*
LqrqK
rw
p
−
=  
[6]     
( )1
2**
LqrqK
rw
p
−
=  
In the end, the role that price premiums can have on the income received by extractors 
under a situation of unmanaged common property, like the one described above, depends on 
the specific values of the biologic and economic parameters.  
 
3.2. An example using the extraction of xate palm 
Xate (Chamaedorea spp.) is a marketable NTFP that grows under the cover of forests. 
Xate palm leaves are used by the floral industry as a backdrop for flowers in wedding and 
funeral displays. They are also in demand during Easter season, particularly on Palm 
Sunday. Xate extraction is an important income generating activity for rural communities 
located in or around forests in México and Guatemala (Endress et al. 2004; Sanchez-Carrillo 
and Valtierra-Pacheco 2003).  
                                                 
2 The situation here is similar to that described in footnote 1 but in this case zero deforestation will be reached when prices 
is greater or equal to p**.  
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The data to obtain the socioeconomic parameters of the model come from two household 
surveys applied in Frontera Corozal, Mexico, during 2001 and 2004. In the first round of the 
survey 100 randomly selected households (approximately 10% of the population) were 
interviewed; these households were visited again during the summer of 2004.  Frontera 
Corozal is a village in the Selva Lacandona (Lacandona Rainforest) in the Mexican state of 
Chiapas. In Frontera Corozal, Community members have exclusive rights to extract natural 
resources from the contiguous rainforest; nevertheless, there are no community rules (formal 
or informal) on how these resources, including xate, should be managed (Sanchez-Carrillo 
and Valtierra- Pacheco 2003; Tejeda 2004). Xate can therefore be considered as an 
unmanaged common property resource.  
The objective of this section is to use xate extraction in Frontera Corozal as an example of 
how the model can be used to estimate the values of *p and **p . It is important to 
emphasize that the results presented here are only illustrative. According to equations 5 and 
6 the socioeconomic parameters needed are 21 ,ww  and 1L . The assumption is that the 
working population of the community can be divided in two groups according to their 
opportunity cost of time.  
Using the data available from the information collected in the surveys we calculate annual 
net earnings for every household in the sample. Then, following Fisher et al. (2005), we 
estimate the opportunity cost at the household level as the quotient of annual net earnings in 
non-xate activities and total days of work allocated to those activities. The average 
opportunity cost of time at the household level is 60 Mexican pesos per-day (the equivalence 
rate at the time of the survey was approximately 10 Mexican pesos per US dollar).
3
 
Almost half of the households have opportunity costs of time of 40 pesos per-day or less 
while for almost 15% the opportunity cost is above a 100, those are the values used to 
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estimate the price bounds ( 401 =w  and 1002 =w ).
4
 The amount of type-1 labor available in 
the community was estimated as 800,551 =L , where labor is measured in days per-year.
5
  
The values for the biologic parameters were estimated using information from Martinez 
(2002) that studied xate in the region of the case study as well as from research done in other 
areas of Mexico and Guatemala (see Endress et al., 2004 and Heinzman and Reining, 1990). 
The parameter values, in terms of palm leaves, are: 000,800,676=K , 181089.0=r and 
0000013978.0=q .  
Therefore, using the biologic and socioeconomic parameters calculated for Frontera 
Corozal the price range [ **,* pp ] is [0.0743,0.1857]. The price of a palm leave in the region 
was 0.0625. Considering that the price is below *p  the model predicts that in equilibrium all 
extractors will be type-1 individuals and more importantly they will be earning their 
opportunity cost of time (40 pesos). To reach the price range where earnings per-day start to 
be above the opportunity cost of time the price has to increase in 19%. Price increases above 
that level will improve earnings per-day. For example, a price premium of a 100% will 
imply that earnings per-day will increase in almost 70% (going from 40 pesos to 67 pesos 
per-day). If the price premium is 197% (or more) earnings will equal the opportunity cost of 
type-2 labor (100 pesos).  
4. Conclusions 
The findings from this analysis have important implications for policies with the dual 
goal of alleviating poverty and promoting conservation. A key objective of recent 
conservation initiatives has been to increase the price paid to NTFP extractors. However, 
under an unmanaged common property regime, an increase in the price of the natural 
resource, say due to a ‘green product’ price premium, does not necessarily help alleviate 
                                                 
4 Clearly there are more precise ways of finding w1 and w2 but the objective here is simply to illustrate how to apply the 
model proposed in the previous sections. For an econometric estimation of the relationship between the opportunity cost of 
time and labor allocation see Lopez-Feldman and Taylor (2009).  
5 To get this number I calculated the number of male adults (female and children very rarely work in xate extraction) in the 
survey that lived in a household with an opportunity cost below 40 and multiplied it by 100 (the maximum number of days 
anybody will allocate to extraction in a given year considering the seasonality of demand). The result, 5,580, is a 
conservative estimation of the maximum number of days that could be allocated to xate extraction by type 1 individuals in 
the sample. In order to extrapolate the sample value to the population I multiplied 5,580 by ten. The same caveat as in 
footnote 4 applies.    
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poverty. Irrespective of how much the price increases, the revenue per-day of work is always 
equal to an individual’s opportunity cost of time, if labor is abundant and responsive with 
open access behavior. On the other hand, if there are constraints on the availability of local 
labor, price increases can in fact raise extraction income above the opportunity cost of time 
and help alleviate poverty even under local open access. That is to say, if a relatively small 
group utilizes the resource, its members can earn from extraction more than their opportunity 
cost of time even if they do not have any internal rules to manage it, provided that they can 
exclude outsiders from extracting.  
The model presented provides very valuable information in terms of the potential 
implications that price premiums can have on extractors’ income. The case study illustrates 
how one could evaluate the effectiveness of different price scenarios. It also shows the kind 
of biologic and socioeconomic information that is needed to apply the methodology 
suggested. The more accurate the information is the more confident one can be about the 
policy recommendations. This is an area of opportunity where applied research between 
economists and ecologists can lead to concrete policy applications.   
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Figure 1. Earnings per-day under relative scarcity of labor  
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Figure 2. Earnings per-day under relative scarcity of heterogeneous labor 
 
 
 
